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Abstract
Deep learning achieves state-of-the-art results in many tasks in computer vision
and natural language processing. However, recent works have shown that deep
networks can be vulnerable to adversarial perturbations, which raised a serious
robustness issue of deep networks. Adversarial training, typically formulated as a
robust optimization problem, is an effective way of improving the robustness of
deep networks. A major drawback of existing adversarial training algorithms is
the computational overhead of the generation of adversarial examples, typically
far greater than that of the network training. This leads to the unbearable overall
computational cost of adversarial training. In this paper, we show that adversarial
training can be cast as a discrete time differential game. Through analyzing the
Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle (PMP) of the problem, we observe that the
adversary update is only coupled with the parameters of the first layer of the
network. This inspires us to restrict most of the forward and back propagation
within the first layer of the network during adversary updates. This effectively
reduces the total number of full forward and backward propagation to only one
for each group of adversary updates. Therefore, we refer to this algorithm YOPO
(You Only Propagate Once). Numerical experiments demonstrate that YOPO can
achieve comparable defense accuracy with approximately 1/5 ∼ 1/4 GPU time
of the projected gradient descent (PGD) algorithm [15].2
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks achieve state-of-the-art performance on many tasks [8,16]. However, recent
works show that deep networks are often sensitive to adversarial perturbations [25,33,46], i.e., changing
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the input in a way imperceptible to humans while causing the neural network to output an incorrect
prediction. This poses significant concerns when applying deep neural networks to safety-critical
problems such as autonomous driving and medical domains. To effectively defend the adversarial
attacks, [24] proposed adversarial training, which can be formulated as a robust optimization [36]:
min
θ
E(x,y)∼D max‖η‖≤
`(θ;x+ η, y), (1)
where θ is the network parameter, η is the adversarial perturbation, and (x, y) is a pair of data
and label drawn from a certain distribution D. The magnitude of the adversarial perturbation η is
restricted by  > 0. For a given pair (x, y), we refer to the value of the inner maximization of (1), i.e.
max‖η‖≤ `(θ;x+ η, y), as the adversarial loss which depends on (x, y).
A major issue of the current adversarial training methods is their significantly high computational cost.
In adversarial training, we need to solve the inner loop, which is to obtain the "optimal" adversarial
attack to the input in every iteration. Such "optimal" adversary is usually obtained using multi-step
gradient decent, and thus the total time for learning a model using standard adversarial training
method is much more than that using the standard training. Considering applying 40 inner iterations
of projected gradient descent (PGD [15]) to obtain the adversarial examples, the computation cost of
solving the problem (1) is about 40 times that of a regular training.
Adversary 
updater
Adversary 
updater Black box
Previous Work
YOPO
Heavy gradient calculation
Figure 1: Our proposed YOPO expolits the structure
of neural network. To alleviate the heavy computation
cost, YOPO focuses the calculation of the adversary at
the first layer.
The main objective of this paper is to re-
duce the computational burden of adver-
sarial training by limiting the number of
forward and backward propagation with-
out hurting the performance of the trained
network. In this paper, we exploit the struc-
tures that the min-max objectives is encoun-
tered with deep neural networks. To achieve
this, we formulate the adversarial training
problem(1) as a differential game. After-
wards we can derive the Pontryagin’s Max-
imum Principle (PMP) of the problem.
From the PMP, we discover a key fact that
the adversarial perturbation is only coupled
with the weights of the first layer. This
motivates us to propose a novel adversarial
training strategy by decoupling the adver-
sary update from the training of the network
parameters. This effectively reduces the to-
tal number of full forward and backward
propagation to only one for each group of
adversary updates, significantly lowering
the overall computation cost without ham-
pering performance of the trained network.
We name this new adversarial training algorithm as YOPO (You Only Propagate Once). Our nu-
merical experiments show that YOPO achieves approximately 4 ∼5 times speedup over the original
PGD adversarial training with comparable accuracy on MNIST/CIFAR10. Furthermore, we apply
our algorithm to a recent proposed min max optimization objective "TRADES" [43] and achieve better
clean and robust accuracy within half of the time TRADES need.
1.1 Related Works
Adversarial Defense. To improve the robustness of neural networks to adversarial examples, many
defense strategies and models have been proposed, such as adversarial training [24], orthogonal reg-
ularization [6,21], Bayesian method [42], TRADES [43], rejecting adversarial examples [41], Jacobian
regularization [14,27], generative model based defense [12,31], pixel defense [23,29], ordinary differential
equation (ODE) viewpoint [44], ensemble via an intriguing stochastic differential equation perspec-
tive [37], and feature denoising [32,40], etc. Among all these approaches, adversarial training and its
variants tend to be most effective since it largely avoids the the obfuscated gradient problem [2].
Therefore, in this paper, we choose adversarial training to achieve model robustness.
2
Neural ODEs. Recent works have built up the relationship between ordinary differential equations
and neural networks [5,10,22,30,35,38,45]. Observing that each residual block of ResNet can be written
as un+1 = un + ∆tf(un), one step of forward Euler method approximating the ODE ut = f(u).
Thus [19,39] proposed an optimal control framework for deep learning and [5,19,20] utilize the adjoint
equation and the maximal principle to train a neural network.
Decouple Training. Training neural networks requires forward and backward propagation in
a sequential manner. Different ways have been proposed to decouple the sequential process by
parallelization. This includes ADMM [34], synthetic gradients [13], delayed gradient [11], lifted ma-
chines [1,9,18]. Our work can also be understood as a decoupling method based on a splitting technique.
However, we do not attempt to decouple the gradient w.r.t. network parameters but the adversary
update instead.
1.2 Contribution
• To the best of our knowledge, it is the first attempt to design NN–specific algorithm for
adversarial defense. To achieve this, we recast the adversarial training problem as a discrete
time differential game. From optimal control theory, we derive the an optimality condition,
i.e. the Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle, for the differential game.
• Through PMP, we observe that the adversarial perturbation is only coupled with the first
layer of neural networks. The PMP motivates a new adversarial training algorithm, YOPO.
We split the adversary computation and weight updating and the adversary computation is
focused on the first layer. Relations between YOPO and original PGD are discussed.
• We finally achieve about 4∼ 5 times speed up than the original PGD training with compa-
rable results on MNIST/CIFAR10. Combining YOPO with TRADES [43], we achieve both
higher clean and robust accuracy within less than half of the time TRADES need.
1.3 Organization
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formulate the robust optimization for neural
network adversarial training as a differential game and propose the gradient based YOPO. In Section 3,
we derive the PMP of the differential game, study the relationship between the PMP and the back-
propagation based gradient descent methods, and propose a general version of YOPO. Finally, all the
experimental details and results are given in Section 4.
2 Differential Game Formulation and Gradient Based YOPO
2.1 The Optimal Control Perspective and Differential Game
Inspired by the link between deep learning and optimal control [20], we formulate the robust optimiza-
tion (1) as a differential game [7]. A two-player, zero-sum differential game is a game where each
player controls a dynamics, and one tries to maximize, the other to minimize, a payoff functional.
In the context of adversarial training, one player is the neural network, which controls the weights
of the network to fit the label, while the other is the adversary that is dedicated to producing a false
prediction by modifying the input.
The robust optimization problem (1) can be written as a differential game as follows,
min
θ
max
‖ηi‖∞≤
J(θ, η) :=
1
N
N∑
i=1
`i(xi,T ) +
1
N
N∑
i=1
T−1∑
t=0
Rt(xi,t; θt)
subject to xi,1 = f0(xi,0 + ηi, θ0), i = 1, 2, · · · , N
xi,t+1 = ft(xi,t, θt), t = 1, 2, · · · , T − 1
(2)
Here, the dynamics {ft(xt, θt), t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1} represent a deep neural network, T denote the
number of layers, θt ∈ Θt denotes the parameters in layer t (denote θ = {θt}t ∈ Θ), the function
ft : Rdt × Θt → Rdt+1 is a nonlinear transformation for one layer of neural network where dt is
the dimension of the t th feature map and {xi,0, i = 1, . . . , N} is the training dataset. The variable
η = (η1, · · · , ηN ) is the adversarial perturbation and we constrain it in an∞-ball. Function `i is a
3
data fitting loss function and Rt is the regularization weights θt such as the L2-norm. By casting
the problem of adversarial training as a differential game (2), we regard θ and η as two competing
players, each trying to minimize/maximize the loss function J(θ, η) respectively.
2.2 Gradient Based YOPO
The Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle (PMP) is a fundamental tool in optimal control that character-
izes optimal solutions of the corresponding control problem [7]. PMP is a rather general framework
that inspires a variety of optimization algorithms. In this paper, we will derive the PMP of the
differential game (2), which motivates the proposed YOPO in its most general form. However, to
better illustrate the essential idea of YOPO and to better address its relations with existing methods
such as PGD, we present a special case of YOPO in this section based on gradient descent/ascent.
We postpone the introduction of PMP and the general version of YOPO to Section 3.
Let us first rewrite the original robust optimization problem (1) (in a mini-batch form) as
min
θ
max
‖ηi‖≤
B∑
i=1
`(gθ˜(f0(xi + ηi, θ0)), yi),
where f0 denotes the first layer, gθ˜ = f
θT−1
T−1 ◦ fθT−2T−2 ◦ · · · fθ11 denotes the network without the first
layer and B is the batch size. Here θ˜ is defined as {θ1, · · · , θT−1}. For simplicity we omit the
regularization term Rt.
The simplest way to solve the problem is to perform gradient ascent on the input data and gradient
descent on the weights of the neural network as shown below. Such alternating optimization algorithm
is essentially the popular PGD adversarial training [24]. We summarize the PGD-r (for each update on
θ) as follows, i.e. performing r iterations of gradient ascent for inner maximization.
• For s = 0, 1, . . . , r − 1, perform
ηs+1i = η
s
i + α1∇ηi`(gθ˜(f0(xi + ηsi , θ0)), yi), i = 1, · · · , B,
where by the chain rule,
∇ηi`(gθ˜(f0(xi + ηsi , θ0)), yi) =∇gθ˜
(
`(gθ˜(f0(xi + η
s
i , θ0)), yi)
) ·
∇f0
(
gθ˜(f0(xi + η
s
i , θ0))
) · ∇ηif0(xi + ηsi , θ0).
• Perform the SGD weight update (momentum SGD can also be used here)
θ ← θ − α2∇θ
(
B∑
i=1
`(gθ˜(f0(xi + η
m
i , θ0)), yi)
)
Note that this method conducts r sweeps of forward and backward propagation for each update of θ.
This is the main reason why adversarial training using PGD-type algorithms can be very slow.
To reduce the total number of forward and backward propagation, we introduce a slack variable
p = ∇gθ˜
(
`(gθ˜(f0(xi + ηi, θ0)), yi)
) · ∇f0 (gθ˜(f0(xi + ηi, θ0)))
and freeze it as a constant within the inner loop of the adversary update. The modified algorithm is
given below and we shall refer to it as YOPO-m-n.
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• Initialize {η1,0i } for each input xi. For j = 1, 2, · · · ,m
– Calculate the slack variable p
p = ∇gθ˜
(
`(gθ˜(f0(xi + η
j,0
i , θ0)), yi)
)
· ∇f0
(
gθ˜(f0(xi + η
j,0
i , θ0))
)
,
– Update the adversary for s = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1 for fixed p
ηj,s+1i = η
j,s
i + α1p · ∇ηif0(xi + ηj,si , θ0), i = 1, · · · , B
– Let ηj+1,0i = η
j,n
i .
• Calculate the weight update
U =
m∑
j=1
∇θ
(
B∑
i=1
`(gθ˜(f0(xi + η
j,n
i , θ0)), yi)
)
and update the weight θ ← θ − α2U . (Momentum SGD can also be used here.)
Intuitively, YOPO freezes the values of the derivatives of the network at level 1, 2 . . . , T − 1 during
the s-loop of the adversary updates. Figure 2 shows the conceptual comprison between YOPO and
PGD. YOPO-m-n accesses the data m× n times while only requires m full forward and backward
propagation. PGD-r, on the other hand, propagates the data r times for r full forward and backward
propagation. As one can see that, YOPO-m-n has the flexibility of increasing n and reducing m to
achieve approximately the same level of attack but with much less computation cost. For example,
suppose one applies PGD-10 (i.e. 10 steps of gradient ascent for solving the inner maximization) to
calculate the adversary. An alternative approach is using YOPO-5-2 which also accesses the data 10
times but the total number of full forward propagation is only 5. Empirically, YOPO-m-n achieves
comparable results only requiring setting m× n a litter larger than r.
Another benefit of YOPO is that we take full advantage of every forward and backward propagation
to update the weights, i.e. the intermediate perturbation ηji , j = 1, · · · ,m − 1 are not wasted like
PGD-r. This allows us to perform multiple updates per iteration, which potentially drives YOPO
to converge faster in terms of the number of epochs. Combining the two factors together, YOPO
significantly could accelerate the standard PGD adversarial training.
We would like to point out a concurrent paper [28] that is related to YOPO. Their proposed method,
called "Free-m", also can significantly speed up adversarial training. In fact, Free-m is essentially
YOPO-m-1, except that YOPO-m-1 delays the weight update after the whole mini-batch is processed
in order for a proper usage of momentum 3.
3 The Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle for Adversarial Training
In this section, we present the PMP of the discrete time differential game (2). From the PMP, we
can observe that the adversary update and its associated back-propagation process can be decoupled.
Furthermore, back-propagation based gradient descent can be understood as an iterative algorithm
solving the PMP and with that the version of YOPO presented in the previous section can be viewed
as an algorithm solving the PMP. However, the PMP facilitates a much wider class of algorithms than
gradient descent algorithms [19]. Therefore, we will present a general version of YOPO based on the
PMP for the discrete differential game.
3.1 PMP
Pontryagin type of maximal principle [3,26] provides necessary conditions for optimality with a
layer-wise maximization requirement on the Hamiltonian function. For each layer t ∈ [T ] :=
3Momentum should be accumulated between mini-batches other than different adversarial examples from
one mini-batch, otherwise overfitting will become a serious problem.
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Figure 2: Pipeline of YOPO-m-n described in Algorithm 1. The yellow and olive blocks represent
feature maps while the orange blocks represent the gradients of the loss w.r.t. feature maps of each
layer.
{0, 1, . . . , T − 1}, we define the Hamiltonian function Ht : Rdt × Rdt+1 ×Θt → R as
Ht(x, p, θt) = p · ft(x, θt)− 1
B
Rt(x, θt).
The PMP for continuous time differential game has been well studied in the literature [7]. Here, we
present the PMP for our discrete time differential game (2).
Theorem 1. (PMP for adversarial training) Assume `i is twice continuous differentiable,
ft(·, θ), Rt(·, θ) are twice continuously differentiable with respect to x; ft(·, θ), Rt(·, θ) together
with their x partial derivatives are uniformly bounded in t and θ, and the sets {ft(x, θ) : θ ∈ Θt}
and {Rt(x, θ) : θ ∈ Θt} are convex for every t and x ∈ Rdt . Denote θ∗ as the solution of the
problem (2), then there exists co-state processes p∗i := {p∗i,t : t ∈ [T ]} such that the following holds
for all t ∈ [T ] and i ∈ [B]:
x∗i,t+1 = ∇pHt(x∗i,t, p∗i,t+1, θ∗t ), x∗i,0 = xi,0 + η∗i (3)
p∗i,t = ∇xHt(x∗i,t, p∗i,t+1, θ∗t ), p∗i,T = −
1
B
∇`i(x∗i,T ) (4)
At the same time, the parameters of the first layer θ∗0 ∈ Θ0 and the optimal adversarial perturbation
η∗i satisfy
B∑
i=1
H0(x
∗
i,0 + ηi, p
∗
i,1, θ
∗
0) ≥
B∑
i=1
H0(x
∗
i,0 + η
∗
i , p
∗
i,1, θ
∗
0) ≥
B∑
i=1
H0(x
∗
i,0 + η
∗
i , p
∗
i,1, θ0), (5)
∀θ0 ∈ Θ0, ‖ηi‖∞ ≤  (6)
and the parameters of the other layers θ∗t ∈ Θt, t ∈ [T ] maximize the Hamiltonian functions
B∑
i=1
Ht(x
∗
i,t, p
∗
i,t+1, θ
∗
t ) ≥
B∑
i=1
Ht(x
∗
i,t, p
∗
i,t+1, θt), ∀θt ∈ Θt (7)
Proof. Proof is in the supplementary materials.
From the theorem, we can observe that the adversary η is only coupled with the parameters of the
first layer θ0. This key observation inspires the design of YOPO.
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3.2 PMP and Back-Propagation Based Gradient Descent
The classical back-propagation based gradient descent algorithm [17] can be viewed as an algorithm
attempting to solve the PMP. Without loss of generality, we can let the regularization term R = 0,
since we can simply add an extra dynamic wt to evaluate the regularization term R, i.e.
wt+1 = wt +Rt(xt, θt), w0 = 0.
We append w to x to study the dynamics of a new (dt + 1)-dimension vector and change ft(x, θt)
to (ft(x, θt), w + Rt(x, θt)). The relationship between the PMP and the back-propagation based
gradient descent method was first observed by Li et al. [19]. They showed that the forward dynamical
system Eq.(3) is the same as the neural network forward propagation. The backward dynamical
system Eq.(4) is the back-propagation, which is formally described by the following lemma.
Lemma 1.
p∗t = ∇xHt(x∗t , p∗t+1, θ∗t ) = ∇xf(x∗t , θ∗t )T pt+1 = (∇xtx∗t+1)T ·−∇xt+1(`(xT )) = −∇xt(`(xT )).
To solve the maximization of the Hamiltonian, a simple way is the gradient ascent:
θ1t = θ
0
t + α · ∇θ
B∑
i=1
Ht(x
θ0
i,t, p
θ0
i,t+1, θ
0
t ). (8)
Theorem 2. The update (8) is equivalent to gradient descent method for training networks [19,20].
3.3 YOPO from PMP’s View Point
Based on the relationship between back-propagation and the Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle, in this
section, we provide a new understanding of YOPO, i.e. solving the PMP for the differential game.
Observing that, in the PMP, the adversary η is only coupled with the weight of the first layer θ0. Thus
we can update the adversary via minimizing the Hamiltonian function instead of directly attacking
the loss function, described in Algorithm 1.
For YOPO-m-n, to approximate the exactly minimization of the Hamiltonian, we perform n times
gradient descent to update the adversary. Furthermore, in order to make the calculation of the
adversary more accurate, we iteratively pass one data point m times. Besides, the network weights
are optimized via performing the gradient ascent to Hamiltonian, resulting in the gradient based
YOPO proposed in Section 2.2.
Algorithm 1 YOPO (You Only Propagate Once)
Randomly initialize the network parameters or using a pre-trained network.
repeat
Randomly select a mini-batch B = {(x1, y1), · · · , (xB , yB)} from training set.
Initialize ηi, i = 1, 2, · · · , B by sampling from a uniform distribution between [-, ]
for j = 1 to m do
xi,0 = xi + η
j
i , i = 1, 2, · · · , B
for t = 0 to T − 1 do
xi,t+1 = ∇pHt(xi,t, pi,t+1, θt), i = 1, 2, · · · , B
end for
pi,T = − 1B∇`(x∗i,T ), i = 1, 2, · · · , B
for t = T − 1 to 0 do
pi,t = ∇xHt(xi,t, pi,t+1, θt), i = 1, 2, · · · , B
end for
ηji = arg minηi H0(xi,0 + ηi, pi,0, θ0), i = 1, 2, · · · , B
end for
for t = T − 1 to 1 do
θt = arg maxθt
∑B
i=1Ht(xi,t, pi,t+1, θt)
end for
θ0 = arg maxθ0
1
m
∑m
k=1
∑B
i=1H0(xi,0 + η
j
i , pi,1, θ0)
until Convergence
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4 Experiments
4.1 YOPO for Adversarial Training
To demonstrate the effectiveness of YOPO, we conduct experiments on MNIST and CIFAR10.
We find that the models trained with YOPO have comparable performance with that of the PGD
adversarial training, but with a much fewer computational cost. We also compare our method with a
concurrent method "For Free" [28], and the result shows that our algorithm can achieve comparable
performance with around 2/3 GPU time of their official implementation.
5 times faster
(a) "Small CNN" [43] Result on MNIST
4 times faster
(b) PreAct-Res18 Results on CIFAR10
Figure 3: Performance w.r.t. training time
MNIST We achieve comparable results with the best in [5] within 250 seconds, while it takes
PGD-40 more than 1250s to reach the same level. The accuracy-time curve is shown in Figuire 3(a).
Naively reducing the backprop times of PGD-40 to PGD-10 will harm the robustness, as can be seen
in Table 1. Experiment details can be seen in supplementary materials.
Training Methods Clean Data PGD-40 Attack CW Attack
PGD-5 [24] 99.43% 42.39% 77.04%
PGD-10 [24] 99.53% 77.00% 82.00%
PGD-40 [24] 99.49% 96.56% 93.52%
YOPO-5-10 (Ours) 99.46% 96.27% 93.56%
Table 1: Results of MNIST robust training. YOPO-5-10 achieves state-of-the-art result as PGD-40.
Notice that for every epoch, PGD-5 and YOPO-5-3 have approximately the same computational cost.
CIFAR10. [24] performs a 7-step PGD to generate adversary while training. As a comparison, we
test YOPO-3-5 and YOPO-5-3 with a step size of 2/255. We experiment with two different network
architectures.
Under PreAct-Res18, for YOPO-5-3, it achieves comparable robust accuracy with [24] with around
half computation for every epoch. The accuracy-time curve is shown in Figuire 3(b).The quantitative
results can be seen in Tbale 2. Experiment details can be seen in supplementary materials.
Training Methods Clean Data PGD-20 Attack CW Attack
PGD-3 [24] 88.19% 32.51% 54.65%
PGD-5 [24] 86.63% 37.78% 57.71%
PGD-10 [24] 84.82% 41.61% 58.88%
YOPO-3-5 (Ours) 82.14% 38.18% 55.73%
YOPO-5-3 (Ours) 83.99% 44.72% 59.77%
Table 2: Results of PreAct-Res18 for CIFAR10. Note that for every epoch, PGD-3 and YOPO-3-5
have the approximately same computational cost, and so do PGD-5 and YOPO-5-3.
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As for Wide ResNet34, YOPO-5-3 still achieves similar acceleration against PGD-10, as shown in
Table 3. We also test PGD-3/5 to show that naively reducing backward times for this minmax prob-
lem [24] cannot produce comparable results within the same computation time as YOPO. Meanwhile,
YOPO-3-5 can achieve more aggressive speed-up with only a slight drop in robustness.
Training Methods Clean Data PGD-20 Attack Training Time (mins)
Natural train 95.03% 0.00% 233
PGD-3 [24] 90.07% 39.18% 1134
PGD-5 [24] 89.65% 43.85% 1574
PGD-10 [24] 87.30% 47.04% 2713
Free-8 [28]1 86.29% 47.00% 667
YOPO-3-5 (Ours) 87.27% 43.04% 299
YOPO-5-3 (Ours) 86.70% 47.98% 476
1 Code from https://github.com/ashafahi/free_adv_train.
Table 3: Results of Wide ResNet34 for CIFAR10.
4.2 YOPO for TRADES
TRADES [43] formulated a new min-max objective function of adversarial defense and achieves the
state-of-the-art adversarial defense results. The details of algorithm and experiment setup are in
supplementary material, and quantitative results are demonstrated in Table 4.
Training Methods Clean Data PGD-20 Attack CW Attack Training Time (mins)
TRADES-10 [43] 86.14% 44.50% 58.40% 633
TRADES-YOPO-3-4 (Ours) 87.82% 46.13% 59.48% 259
TRADES-YOPO-2-5 (Ours) 88.15% 42.48% 59.25% 218
Table 4: Results of training PreAct-Res18 for CIFAR10 with TRADES objective
5 Conclusion
In this work, we have developed an efficient strategy for accelerating adversarial training. We recast
the adversarial training of deep neural networks as a discrete time differential game and derive a
Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle (PMP) for it. Based on this maximum principle, we discover
that the adversary is only coupled with the weights of the first layer. This motivates us to split the
adversary updates from the back-propagation gradient calculation. The proposed algorithm, called
YOPO, avoids computing full forward and backward propagation for too many times, thus effectively
reducing the computational time as supported by our experiments.
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A Proof Of The Theorems
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
In this section we give the full statement of the maximum principle for the adversarial training and
present a proof. Let’s start from the case of the natural training of neural networks.
Theorem. (PMP for adversarial training) Assume `i is twice continuous differentiable,
ft(·, θ), Rt(·, θ) are twice continuously differentiable with respect to x, and ft(·, θ), Rt(·, θ) to-
gether with their x partial derivatives are uniformly bounded in t and θ. The sets {ft(x, θ) : θ ∈ Θt}
and {Rt(x, θ) : θ ∈ Θt} are convex for every t and x ∈ Rdt . Let θ∗ to be the solution of
min
θ∈Θ
max
‖η‖∞≤
J(θ, η) :=
1
N
N∑
i=1
`i(xi,T ) +
1
N
N∑
i=1
T−1∑
t=0
Rt(xi,t, θt) (9)
subject to xi,1 = f0(xi,0 + ηi; θ0), i = 1, 2, · · · , N (10)
xi,t+1 = ft(xi,t, θt), t = 1, 2, · · · , T − 1. (11)
Then there exists co-state processes p∗i := p
∗
i,t : t = 0, · · · , T such that the following holds for all
t ∈ [T ] and i ∈ [N ]:
x∗i,t+1 = ∇pHt(x∗i,t, p∗i,t+1, θ∗t ), x∗i,0 = xi,0 + η∗i (12)
p∗i,t = ∇xHt(x∗i,t, p∗i,t+1, θ∗t ), p∗i,T = −
1
N
∇`i(x∗i,T ) (13)
Here H is the per-layer defined Hamiltonian function Ht : Rdt × Rdt+1 ×Θt → R as
Ht(x, p, θt) = p · ft(x, θt)− 1
N
Rt(x, θt)
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At the same time, the parameter of the first layer θ∗0 ∈ Θ0 and the best perturbation η∗ satisfy
N∑
i=1
H0(x
∗
i,0 + ηi, p
∗
i,1, θ
∗
0) ≥
N∑
i=1
H0(x
∗
i,0 + η
∗
i , p
∗
i,1, θ
∗
0) ≥
N∑
i=1
H0(x
∗
i,0 + η
∗
i , p
∗
i,1, θ0),∀θ0 ∈ Θ0, ‖ηi‖∞ ≤ 
(14)
while parameter of the other layers θ∗t ∈ Θt, t = 1, 2, · · · , T − 1 will maximize the Hamiltonian
functions
N∑
i=1
Ht(x
∗
i,t, p
∗
i,t+1, θ
∗
t ) ≥
N∑
i=1
Ht(x
∗
i,t, p
∗
i,t+1, θt),∀θt ∈ Θt (15)
Proof. We first propose PMP for discrete time dynamic system and utilize it directly gives out the
proof of PMP for adversarial training.
Lemma 2. (PMP for discrete time dynamic system) Assume ` is twice continuous differentiable,
ft(·, θ), Rt(·, θ) are twice continuously differentiable with respect to x, and ft(·, θ), Rt(·, θ) together
with their x partial derivatives are uniformly bounded in t and θ. The sets {ft(x, θ) : θ ∈ Θt} and
{Rt(x, θ) : θ ∈ Θt} are convex for every t and x ∈ Rdt . Let θ∗ to be the solution of
min
θ∈Θ
max
‖η‖∞≤
J(θ, η) :=
1
N
N∑
i=1
`i(xi,T ) +
1
N
N∑
i=1
T−1∑
t=0
Rt(xi,t, θt) (16)
subject to xi,t+1 = ft(xi,t, θt), i ∈ [N ], t = 0, 1, · · · , T − 1. (17)
There exists co-state processes p∗i := p
∗
i,t : t = 0, · · · , T such that the following holds for all t ∈ [T ]
and i ∈ [N ]:
x∗i,t+1 = ∇pHt(x∗i,t, p∗i,t+1, θ∗t ), x∗i,0 = xi,0 (18)
p∗i,t = ∇xHt(x∗i,t, p∗i,t+1, θ∗t ), p∗i,T = −
1
N
∇`i(x∗i,T ) (19)
Here H is the per-layer defined Hamiltonian function Ht : Rdt × Rdt+1 ×Θt → R as
Ht(x, p, θt) = p · ft(x, θt)− 1
N
Rt(x, θt)
The parameters of the layers θ∗t ∈ Θt, t = 0, 1, · · · , T − 1 will maximize the Hamiltonian functions
N∑
i=1
Ht(x
∗
i,t, p
∗
i,t+1, θ
∗
t ) ≥
N∑
i=1
Ht(x
∗
i,t, p
∗
i,t+1, θt),∀θt ∈ Θt (20)
Proof. Without loss of generality, we let L = 0. The reason is that we can simply add an extra
dynamic wt to calculate the regularization term R, i.e.
wt+1 = wt +Rt(xt, θt), w0 = 0.
We append w to x to study the dynamic of a new dt + 1 dimension vector and modify ft(x, θ) to
(ft(x, θ), w +Rt(x, θ)). Thus we only need to prove the case when L = 0.
For simplicity, we omit the subscript s in the following proof. (Concatenating all xs into x =
(x1, . . . , xN ) can justify this.)
Now we begin the proof. Following the linearization lemma in [20], consider the linearized problem
φt+1 = ft(x
∗
t , θt) +∇xft(x∗t , θt)(φt − x∗t ), φ0 = x0 + η. (21)
The reachable states by the linearized dynamic system is denoted as
Wt := {x ∈ Rdt : ∃θ, η = η∗ s.t. φθt = x}
here xθt denotes the the evolution of the dynamical system for xt under θ. We also define
S := {x ∈ RdT : (x− x∗T )∇`(x∗T ) < 0}
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The linearization lemma in [20] tells us thatWT and S are separated by {x : p∗T · (x−x∗T ) = 0, p∗T =−∇`(x∗T )}, i.e.
p∗T · (x− x∗T ) ≤ 0,∀x ∈Wt. (22)
Thus setting
p∗t = ∇xHt(x∗t , p∗t+1, θ∗t ) = ∇xf(x∗t , θ∗t )T · p∗t+1,
we have
(φt+1 − x∗t+1) · p∗t = (φt − x∗t ) · p∗t . (23)
Thus from Eq.22 and Eq.23 we get
p∗t+1 · (φθt+1 − x∗t+1) ≤ 0, t = 0, · · · , T − 1,∀θ ∈ Θ := Θ0 ×Θ1 × · · ·
Setting θs = θ∗s for s < t we have φ
θ
t+1 = ft(x
∗
t , θt), which leads to p
∗
t+1 · (ft(x∗t , θt)− x∗t+1) ≤ 0.
This finishes the proof of the maximal principle on weight space Θ.
We return to the proof of the theorem. The proof of the maximal principle on the weight space, i.e.
N∑
i=1
Ht(x
∗
i,t, p
∗
i,t+1, θ
∗
t ) ≥
N∑
i=1
Ht(x
∗
i,t, p
∗
i,t+1, θ),∀θt ∈ Θt, t = 1, 2, · · · , T − 1
and
N∑
i=1
H0(x
∗
i,0 + η
∗
i , p
∗
i,1, θ
∗
0) ≥
N∑
i=1
H0(x
∗
i,0 + η
∗
i , p
∗
i,1, θ0),∀θ0 ∈ Θ0,
can be reached with the help of Lemma 2: replacing the dynamic start point xi,0 in Eq.18 with
xi,0 + η
∗
i makes this maximal principle a direct corollary of Lemma 2.
Next, we prove the Hamiltonian conidition for the adversary, i.e.
N∑
i=1
H0(x
∗
i,0 + η
∗
i , p
∗
i,1, θ
∗
0) ≤
N∑
i=1
H0(x
∗
i,0 + ηi, p
∗
i,1, θ
∗
0),∀‖ηi‖∞ ≤  (24)
Assuming Ri,t = 0 like above, we define a new optimal control problem with target function
˜`
i() = −`i() and previous dynamics except xi,1 = f˜0(xi,0; θ0, ηi) = f0(xi,0 + ηi; θ0):
min
‖η‖∞≤
J˜(θ, η) :=
1
N
N∑
i=1
˜`
i(xi,T ) (25)
subject to xi,1 = f˜0(xi,0; θ0, ηi), i = 1, 2, · · · , N (26)
xi,t+1 = ft(xi,t, θt), t = 1, 2, · · · , T − 1. (27)
However in this time, all the layer parameters θt are fixed and ηi is the control. From the above
Lemma 2 we get
x˜∗i,1 = ∇pH˜0(x˜∗i,0, p˜∗i,1, θ0, η∗i ), x˜∗i,t+1 = ∇pHt(x˜∗i,t, p˜∗i,t+1, θt), x˜∗i,0 = xi,0, (28)
p˜∗i,0 = ∇xH˜0(x˜∗i,0, p˜∗i,1, θ0, η∗i ), p˜∗i,t = ∇xHt(x˜∗i,t, p˜∗i,t+1, θt), p˜∗i,T =
1
N
∇`i(x˜∗i,T ), (29)
where H˜0(x, p, θ0, η) = p · f˜0(x; θ0, η) = p · f0(x + η; θ0) and t = 1, · · · , T − 1. This gives the
fact that x˜∗i,t = x
∗
i,t. Lemma 2 also tells us
N∑
i=1
H˜0(x˜
∗
i,0, p˜
∗
i,t+1, θ0, η
∗
i ) ≥
N∑
i=1
H˜0(x˜
∗
i,0, p˜
∗
i,1, θ0, ηi),∀‖ηi‖∞ ≤  (30)
which is
N∑
i=1
p˜∗i,1 · f0(x˜∗i,0 + η∗i ; θ0) ≥
N∑
i=1
p˜∗i,1 · f0(x˜∗i,0 + ηi; θ0),∀‖ηi‖∞ ≤  (31)
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On the other hand, Lemma 2 gives
p˜∗t = −∇xt(˜`(xT )) = ∇xt(`(xT )) = −p∗t .
Then we have
N∑
i=1
p∗i,1 · f0(x∗i,0 + η∗i ; θ0) ≤
N∑
i=1
p∗i,1 · f0(x∗i,0 + ηi; θ0),∀‖ηi‖∞ ≤  (32)
which is
N∑
i=1
H0(x
∗
i,0, p
∗
i,t+1, θ0, η
∗
i ) ≤
N∑
i=1
H0(x
∗
i,0, p
∗
i,1, θ0, ηi),∀‖ηi‖∞ ≤  (33)
This finishes the proof for the adversarial control.
Remark. The additional assumption that the sets {ft(x, θ) : θ ∈ Θt} and {Rt(x, θ) : θ ∈ Θt} are
convex for every t and x ∈ Rdt is extremely weak and is not unrealistic which is already explained
in [20].
B Experiment Setup
B.1 MNIST
Training against PGD-40 is a common practice to get sota results on MNIST. We adopt network
architectures from [43] with four convolutional layers followed by three fully connected layers. Fol-
lowing [43] and [24], we set the size of perturbation as  = 0.3 in an infinite norm sense. Experiments
are taken on idle NVIDIA Tesla P100 GPUs. We train models for 55 epochs with a batch size of 256,
longer than what convergence needs for both training methods. The learning rate is set to 0.1 initially,
and is lowered by 10 times at epoch 45. We use a weight decay of 5e− 4 and a momentum of 0.9.
To measure the robustness of trained models, we performed a PGD-40 and CW [4] attack with CW
coefficient c = 5e2 and lr = 1e− 2.
B.2 CIFAR-10
Following [24], we take Preact-ResNet18 and Wide ResNet-34 as the models for testing. We set the
the size of perturbation as  = 8/255 in an infinite norm sense. We perform a 20 steps of PGD with
step size 2/255 when testing. For PGD adversarial training, we train models for 105 epochs as a
common practice. The learning rate is set to 5e − 2 initially, and is lowered by 10 times at epoch
79, 90 and 100. For YOPO-m-n, we train models for 40 epochs which is much longer than what
convergence needs. The learning rate is set to 0.2/m initially, and is lowered by 10 times at epoch
30 and 36. We use a batch size of 256, a weight decay of 5e− 4 and a momentum of 0.9 for both
algorithm. We also test our model’s robustness under CW attack [4] with c = 5e2 and lr = 1e− 2.
The experiments are taken on idle NVIDIA GeForce GTX 1080 Ti GPUs.
B.3 TRADES
TRADES [43] achieves the state-of-the-art results in adversarial defensing. The methodology achieves
the 1st place out of the 1,995 submissions in the robust model track of NeurIPS 2018 Adversarial
Vision Challenge. TRADES proposed a surrogate loss which quantify the trade-off in terms of the
gap between the risk for adversarial examples and the risk for non-adversarial examples and the
objective function can be formulated as
min
θ
E(x,y)∼D max‖η‖≤
(`(fθ(x), y) + L (fθ (x) , fθ (x+ η)) /λ) (34)
where fθ(x) is the neural network parameterized by θ, ` denotes the loss function, L(·, ·) denotes the
consistency loss and λ is a balancing hyper parameter which we set to be 1 as in [43]. To solve the
min-max problem, [43] also searched the ascent direction via the gradient of the "adversarial loss", i.e.
generating the adversarial example before performing gradient descent on the weight. Specifically,
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the PGD attack is performed to maximize a consistency loss instead of classification loss. For each
clean data x, a single iteration of the adversarial attach can be formulated as
x′ ← Π‖x′−x‖≤ (α1 sign (∇x′L (fθ (x) , fθ (x′))) + x′) ,
where Π is projection operator. In the implementation of [43], after 10 such update iterations for each
input data xi, the update for weights is performed as
θ ← θ − α2
B∑
i=1
∇θ [` (fθ (xi) , yi) + L (fθ (xi) , fθ (x′i)) /λ] /B,
where B is the batch size. We name this algorithm as TRADES-10, for it uses 10 iterations to update
the adversary.
Following the notation used in previous section, we denote f0 as the first layer of the neural network
and gθ˜ denotes the network without the first layer. The whole network can be formulated as the
compostion of the two parts, i.e. fθ = gθ˜ ◦ f0. To apply our gradient based YOPO method to
TRADES, following Section 2, we decouple the adversarial calculation and network updating as
shown in Algorithm 2. Projection operation is omitted. Notice that in Section.2 we take advantage
every intermediate perturbation ηj , j = 1, · · · ,m− 1 to update network weights while here we only
use the final perturbation η = ηm to compute the final loss term. In practice, this accumulation of
gradient doesn’t helps. For TRADES-YOPO, acceleration of YOPO is brought by decoupling the
adversarial calculation with the gradient back propagation.
Algorithm 2 TRADES-YOPO-m-n
Randomly initialize the network parameters or using a pre-trained network.
repeat
Randomly select a mini-batch B = {(x1, y1), · · · , (xB , yB)} from training set.
Initialize η1,0i , i = 1, 2, · · · , B by sampling from a uniform distribution between [-, ]
for j = 1 to m do
pi = ∇gθ˜
(
L
(
gθ˜
(
f0
(
xi + η
j,0
i , θ0
))
, gθ˜ (f0 (xi, θ0))
))
· ∇f0
(
gθ˜(f0(xi + η
j,0
i , θ0))
)
,
i = 1, 2, · · · , B
for s = 0 to n− 1 do
ηj,s+1i ← ηj,si + α1 · pi · ∇ηf0(xi + ηj,si , θ0), i = 1, 2, · · · , B
end for
ηj+1,0i = η
j,n
i , i = 1, 2, · · · , B
end for
θ ← θ − α2
∑B
i=1∇θ [` (fθ (xi) , yi) + L (fθ (xi) , fθ (xi + ηm,ni )) /λ] /B.
until Convergence
We name this algorithm as TRADES-YOPO-m-n. With less than half time of TRADES-10, TRADES-
YOPO-3-4 achieves even better result than its baseline. Quantitative results is demonstrated in Table
4. The mini-batch size is 256. All the experiments run for 105 epochs and the learning rate set to
2e− 1 initially, and is lowered by 10 times at epoch 70, 90 and 100. The weight decay coefficient is
5e− 4 and momentum coefficient is 0.9. We also test our model’s robustness under CW attack [4]
with c = 5e2 and lr = 5e− 4. Experiments are taken on idle NVIDIA Tesla P100 GPUs.
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